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Institutional pressure, ultimate ownership, and corporate carbon reduction engagement: 
Evidence from China 
Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between institutional pressure and corporate 
carbon reduction engagement, as well as the moderating effect of ultimate ownership in China. 
Using a sample of 2511 firms that were listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 
2014 and 2015, we find that institutional pressure arising from government evaluation has a 
positive influence on corporate carbon reduction engagement. Moreover, the positive effect is 
stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) than for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
subsequent analysis shows that carbon reduction engagement in NSOEs is positively associated 
with firms’ access to state-owned bank loans. We further observe that there is a momentum of 
carbon reduction engagement due to institutional pressure. Our findings shed light on how 
institutional pressure influences firms’ decision to engage in carbon reduction and the 
effectiveness of the carbon reduction policy in China.  






Scientific evidence for climate change and the heat-trapping nature of carbon dioxide 
and other gases is unequivocal. For the first time, all nations came to a unanimous decision to 
undertake collective efforts to combat climate change at the 2015 Paris Climate Summit, and 
170 Parties have ratified the Paris Agreement Convention so far. Since the US pulled out of 
this Convention in June 2017, China has been taking a leading role in the global climate 
action and ecological civilization endeavor. In the past twenty years, China has achieved an 
average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 10% and had the second largest 
GDP in the world in 2015. However, this rapid economic growth has jeopardized the 
environmental conditions in China, and China replaced the United States as the world’s 
largest carbon emitter in 2009. As a result, the Chinese government is determined to improve 
the environmental conditions and to transform from a capital-intensive and industry-
dominated economy to a more sustainable one with a particular focus on fulfilling its 
international responsibility to tackle climate change issues and to reduce carbon emissions. 
Therefore, it is interesting to study how the Chinese government has promoted its low-carbon 
economy and the Chinese firms’ responses to these initiatives. 
In China, both the central and local governments prioritized economic development over 
environmental concerns until the eleventh Five-Year Plan. This Plan, however, only provided 
a general statement on controlling climate change without specifying the actual targets or 
performance measures. In the twelfth Five-Year Plan, unprecedented attention was given to 
climate change issues, and specific targets and comprehensive measures were introduced. 
However, this system did not noticeably alter the local officials’ political incentives to engage 
in carbon abatement (Sun, 2018). In addition, the policies were poorly implemented and were 
distorted by the local officials due to unreasonable configurations of the objectives and the 
imperfect statistical system (Lo, 2014). In the thirteenth Five-Year Plan, the Chinese 
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government further listed climate change mitigation and carbon emission reductions as one of 
the five focuses of its agenda. This reflects the great determination of the central government 
to tackle climate change issues. More importantly, since 2014, the central government has 
designated the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a powerful 
authority in China, to evaluate the progress on regional carbon reductions. The evaluation can 
then be used as an explicit reference in the appointment, promotion, and rotation of local 
government officials. According to the coercive isomorphism of institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the evaluation scheme is expected to exert incremental 
institutional pressure on local governments and firms and, as a result, a balance between 
sustainable economic development and continuous climate change improvements has to be 
achieved. Institutional pressure refers to the force that is exerted on firms within the same 
field to constrain organizational choices and ensure organizational conformity (Colwell & 
Joshi, 2013). This study takes advantage of this unique institutional dynamic to investigate 
firms’ responses to the institutional pressures that are caused by the carbon evaluation 
mechanism. 
While more attention has been paid to institutional pressure as an important driving 
force of corporate carbon reduction engagement (Baboukardos, 2017; de Aguiar & 
Bebbington, 2014; Herold, Farr-Wharton, Lee, & Groschopf, 2018; Herold & Lee, 2019; Lan, 
2017; Luo, Lan, & Tang, 2012; Niedertscheider, Haas, & Görg, 2018; Sadler, 2016; Tang, 
2018), the findings of previous studies have yielded mixed results. For instance, some studies 
find that institutional pressure has a positive influence on corporate carbon reduction 
engagement (e.g., Herold et al., 2018; Herold & Lee, 2019; Tang, 2018), while others reveal 
that the influence is insignificant (e.g., Lo, 2014; Sun, 2018). Moreover, firms respond 
heterogeneously to institutional pressure (Colwell & Joshi, 2013; Fikru, 2014), and corporate 
carbon reduction disclosures and performance vary extensively between firms when they are 
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subject to a homogeneous level of institutional pressure (Lan, 2017). Thus, it is necessary to 
empirically investigate the potential factors that drive firms’ heterogeneous responses to 
institutional pressure. 
Previous studies demonstrate how firm size, competitive position and the degree of 
internationalization moderate institutional pressure on firms’ environmental engagement 
(Sadler, 2016), but the understanding of how ultimate ownership affects this relationship 
remains limited. In China, firms’ ultimate ownership is an important schema for reflecting 
corporate traits that affect cognition and behavior. Ultimate ownership refers to the identity of 
the largest shareholder, that is, the ultimate owner (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999; Ruiqi, Wang, Xu, & Yuan, 2017). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are assets of 
government, and their ultimate owners belong to the government or government-controlled 
institutions (Ruiqi et al., 2017). SOEs are therefore perceived not simply as business entities 
but also as affiliations of the government. Prior studies evidence the existence of regulatory 
discrimination between SOEs and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) (Wei & Wang, 1997; 
Yen & Abosag, 2016), which is exacerbated by the variation in the economic and legal 
institutions across different provinces in China (Kusnadi, Yang, & Zhou, 2015). Nevertheless, 
this linkage does not exempt firms from institutional pressure; instead, it changes the nature 
of firms’ responsiveness to the pressure (Cui & Jiang, 2012).  
This study focuses on the impact of institutional pressure and ultimate ownership on 
corporate carbon reduction engagement in the Chinese setting. Some existing studies provide 
evidence on binding regulations and mandatory policies concerning firms’ social and 
environmental engagement (Andrew & Cortese, 2011; Baboukardos, 2017), while in China, 
the issue of environmental policy is mainly in the form of notifications and it, essentially, 
lacks authority (Liao, 2018). Zhao (2012) highlights the importance of nonregulatory state-
business interactions for understanding the dynamics of corporate social and environmental 
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responsibilities. The author calls for further studies on the institution-organization linkage to 
understand the nature of firms’ social and environmental responsibilities beyond mere legal 
compliance. Our study responds to this call by investigating the association between the 
Chinese government’s carbon evaluation scheme and corporate carbon reduction engagement. 
In particular, we advance the existing literature by offering a political perspective on whether 
the ultimate ownership influences firms’ carbon reduction decisions in response to 
institutional pressure. 
We examine a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2014 to 2015, during which the 
central government delegated the NDRC to evaluate the local carbon reduction performance. 
We employ carbon reduction reporting and carbon reduction performance as the two 
measures of corporate carbon reduction engagement. After controlling for other determinants 
that were used in the existing literature, our results show that institutional pressure arising 
from the evaluation scheme has been effective at promoting firms’ engagement in carbon 
reduction. Consistent with an institutional and political view of legitimacy, NSOEs are more 
responsive than SOEs to such institutional pressure. Further tests reveal that the carbon 
reduction engagement of NSOEs has a significant impact on firms’ access to state-owned 
bank loans while no significant impact is found for government subsidies. This partly 
explains why NSOEs are more responsive to government initiatives. 
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, our research identifies the 
motivational role of institutional pressure on firms’ carbon reduction engagement in China, 
which complements the existing evidence on the determinants of carbon reduction 
engagement (Ben-Amar, Chang, & McIlkenny, 2017; Ben-Amar, McIlkenny, & Comyns, 
2015; Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015). Current literature on the role of the government in 
promoting corporate carbon reduction engagement often focus on the institutional pressure 
from formal regulatory frameworks and policies (Andrew & Cortese, 2011; Baboukardos, 
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2017), the institutional pressure that is perceived by firms (Lan, 2017; Tang, 2018), and the 
institutional pressure from government initiatives in developed economies (Liu & Yang, 2018; 
Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). For developing economies such as China, businesses tend 
to prioritize profits and growth over social and environmental responsibilities, and thus 
mandatory interventions from the government are deemed to be essential (Lo, 2014; Sun, 
2018). Indeed, Lo (2014) and Sun (2018) report that the Chinese government’s energy-
conservation target responsibility system has not noticeably changed the local governments’ 
incentives to reduce carbon emissions. However, our findings show that the introduction of 
the evaluation and monitoring mechanism has imposed a stronger incentive for firms to 
engage in carbon reduction activities. 
Second, this study advances the understanding of the influence of ultimate ownership on 
firms’ carbon reduction decisions from a political perspective. Some institutional scholars 
suggest that coercive pressure results in industry and firm-level heterogeneity rather than 
isomorphism (Clemens & Douglas, 2006; Hoffman, 1999). Our findings highlight the 
importance of ultimate ownership in explaining firms’ heterogeneous responsiveness to the 
institutional pressure, e.g., NSOEs are more responsive than SOEs. Prior research has 
examined the institutional mechanism in which firms are independent of institutions (Colwell 
& Joshi, 2013; Fikru, 2014; Herold & Lee, 2019; Tingey-Holyoak, 2014), but very few 
studies have examined the institutional process when firms are naturally connected to the 
institutions (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Lan, 2017; Tang, 2018). Our study provides a unique setting 
to empirically examine firms’ heterogeneous responses to homogenous pressure. 
Third, we provide important insights into the financial incentives motivating firms to 
engage in government's carbon reduction policies. According to the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, firms with carbon reduction engagement could benefit from 
concessional loans at relatively lower interest rates. Our further analysis on firms’ access to 
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state-owned bank loans further substantiates the existence of financial incentives that underlie 
the influence of institutional pressure on firms’ carbon reduction engagement. Government 
financial support is an effective incentive to motivate firms to strike a balance between their 
financial performance and their social and environmental responsibilities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research methodology. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results and the conclusion follows in Section 5. 
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Institutional pressure and carbon reduction engagement 
Institutional theory is concerned with the relationship between the organization and its 
environment and recognizes the influence of the environment on organizational structures 
and processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2006). While the efficiency incentive is not 
sufficient to explain why organizations are becoming more homogeneous, institutional theory 
posits that organizations incorporate social and institutional beliefs in order to maintain their 
stability and legitimacy in society rather than to achieve organizational efficiency (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory, therefore, asserts that the 
external environment and the institutions create pressure for an adaptation cycle and lead to 
homogeneity in organizational structures and practices, where isomorphism best captures the 
homogenization process among organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) argue that coercive forces, as well as normative and mimetic forces, force 
organizations to adopt specific strategies. Coercive refers to the ways in which organizations 
are coerced into a course of actions as a result of both formal and informal pressures that 
exerted on the organization by other institutions. Institutions that are able to enforce such 
changes in organizations are usually powerful constituents, e.g., the government, certification 
bodies or powerful stakeholders. 
8 
 
Institutional theory has been applied to the study of corporate responsiveness to 
environmental issues. For example, institutional pressure is found to be an important 
determinant of corporate carbon reduction performance (Lan, 2017; Niedertscheider et al., 
2018) and carbon reduction disclosures (Baboukardos, 2017; de Aguiar & Bebbington, 2014; 
Lan, 2017; Luo et al., 2012; Sadler, 2016; Tang, 2018). Other studies find that corporate 
environmental management decisions are reactions to multiple internal and external pressures 
that coexist and are coconstructed with institutional pressure (Herold et al., 2018; Herold & 
Lee, 2019; Rothenberg, 2007). In addition, institutional pressure also influences the 
association between corporate carbon emission disclosure and carbon emission performance 
(Luo, 2017). However, the empirical results of institutional pressure on firms’ environmental 
engagement are not conclusive. Lo (2014) and Sun (2018) conclude that the institutional 
pressure from the energy conservation scheme in China has an insignificant influence on 
local officials’ incentives to engage in carbon reduction.  
Indeed, the Chinese central government launched energy conservation on a nationwide 
scale in 2005 and introduced energy conservation into the target responsibility system to 
evaluate local governments in 2006. This initiative, before the introduction of the NDRC 
evaluation, was overshadowed by economic targets and did not promote the convergence of 
per capita CO2 emissions (Sun, 2018). Since 2014, the Chinese central government has 
delegated the NDRC as a powerful authority to evaluate and publish regional carbon 
reduction progress and the results would constitute an explicit reference in the appointment, 
promotion, and rotation of local government officials, which is a typical reflection of a 
regionally decentralized authoritarian regime (RDAR). China has been characterized as an 
RDAR country (Xu, 2011). The RDAR features highly centralized political and personnel 
controls at the national level, and a regionally decentralized administrative and economic 
system (Xu, 2011). Despite the extensive autonomy of the local governments, the central 
9 
 
government retains the ultimate power to appoint, promote, and rotate local officials, which 
serves as a powerful incentive for local officials to follow the central government’s policies. 
As a transitional economy and RDAR, the Chinese government intervenes in economic 
and social activities not only through regulations and taxation but also through channels such 
as enforcement, licenses, quotas, permits, and franchise assignments (Lee, Walker, & Zeng, 
2017; Wong, 2016). Although the central government has not directly intervened in carbon 
reduction, the launch of a regional carbon reduction evaluation scheme could play a vital role 
in urging local governments and their regional enterprises to engage. According to the 
coercive isomorphism of institutional theory, firms are coerced into a course of actions as a 
result of both formal and informal pressures that exerted on the organization by other 
institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Although the energy conservation initiative is found 
to have an insignificant influence on carbon abatement in its earlier stage (Lo, 2014; Sun, 
2018), we argue that when the central government prioritized carbon reduction in its agenda 
and appointed the NDRC to monitor the progress, coercive pressure was formed on local 
governments and firms. This discussion leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1 Corporate carbon reduction engagement is positively associated with institutional 
pressure. 
2.2 Institutional pressure, ultimate ownership and carbon reduction engagement 
Some institutional scholars argue that institutional pressure, particularly coercive 
pressure, results in industry and firm-level variations in strategies and practices rather than 
isomorphism (Clemens & Douglas, 2006; Hoffman, 1999). Firms will consider their current 
circumstances when making decisions under institutional pressure (Berrone, Fosfuri, Gelabert, 
& Gomez-Mejia, 2013). Previous study demonstrates how firm size, competitive position and 
the degree of internationalization moderate institutional pressure on firms’ environmental 
engagement (Sadler, 2016); however, the understanding of the effect of ultimate ownership 
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on such a relationship remains limited. Ultimate ownership affects corporate responsiveness 
to institutional pressure in the following ways. 
First, firms need to proactively secure legitimacy for their long-term growth prospects 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), which is especially vital for NSOEs. With institutional pressure 
from local government, NSOEs are expected to be more responsive in promptly adopting the 
government’s policies. In contrast, when facing institutional dynamics, SOEs have very 
limited legitimacy threats due to government protection. As such, NSOEs are likely to be 
more responsive to institutional pressure than SOEs. 
Second, SOEs, whose ultimate owner is the government, are highly influenced by 
national policies to assist the government in accomplishing broader political and social goals 
(Jefferson, 1998). The management of SOEs in China is composed of quasi-government 
officials who are evaluated by a bureaucratic system that is not necessarily focusing on firms’ 
profitability but rather on carrying out government policy mandates (Dong & Putterman, 
2003). Consequently, SOEs are more likely to actively engage in carbon reduction due to 
their nature than NSOEs and are not just limited to despondence to institutional pressure. 
Therefore, the link between institutional pressure and carbon reduction engagement should be 
weaker in SOEs. 
Third, because of being highly connected to the government, SOEs have soft budget 
constraints and are also entitled to more financial resources than NSOEs (Dong & Putterman, 
2003; Wong, 2016). Generally, SOEs have better access to government-supported resources, 
which help them to engage in environmental-friendly activities (Lee et al., 2017). NSOEs 
need to cultivate/maintain connections with the government to acquire better operating 
environments and financial benefits (Kusnadi et al., 2015; Yen & Abosag, 2016), such as 
easier access to the debt market (Herbohn, Gao, & Clarkson, 2017; Jung, Herbohn, & 
Clarkson, 2016) and government subsidies (Lee et al., 2017). The government often uses 
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financial policy, such as concessional loans and government subsidies, to inspire firms to 
conform to the institutional pressure. To gain access to more financial resources, NSOEs are 
expected to be more sensitive to government carbon reduction initiatives than SOEs. 
From these perspectives, we argue that NSOEs’ carbon reduction engagement is more 
correlated with institutional pressure than that of SOEs’. Based on the above arguments, we 
posit our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2 The positive relationship between institutional pressure and corporate carbon reduction 
engagement is more pronounced among NSOEs than SOEs.  
3 Research Design 
3.1 Sample and data 
Our initial sample includes all A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2015. 
We investigate the period from 2014 to 2015 for the following reasons: (1) the evaluation of 
provincial carbon reductions by the NDRC began in 2014, (2) the evaluation was restructured 
after 2015 with the start of the next Five-Year Plan in which there are incomparable regional 
carbon reduction targets (Yuan & Zuo, 2011), and (3) the data of the regional evaluation 
results of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan are not publicly available. We process the sample 
according to the following criteria: (1) companies in the financial industry are excluded (101 
observations), and (2) samples with missing data are excluded (1,305 observations). Our final 
sample includes 4,663 firm-year observations of 2,511 listed companies. Financial and 
corporate governance data are obtained from the China Securities Markets and Accounting 
Research database (CSMAR). 
3.2 Dependent variable: corporate carbon reduction engagement 
Concerning corporate carbon reduction engagement, we consider both carbon reduction 
reporting and carbon reduction performance. In recent climate change studies, it is 
consistently accepted that carbon emission performance or carbon emission reporting should 
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not be examined alone without considering the other (Matsumura, Prakash, & Vera-Muñoz, 
2014). We therefore employ two measures of carbon reduction engagement: carbon reduction 
reporting (CRE1) and carbon reduction performance (CRE2). 
With regard to CRE1, we follow a qualitative content analysis approach to rate the 
disclosure quality of firms’ annual reports and CSR reports (Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016; 
Wiseman, 1982). Each report was hand-reviewed to acquire the detail descriptions of the 
carbon reduction information. A score of 2 was assigned if quantitative carbon reduction 
related information was present, a score of 1 was assigned if only qualitative carbon 
reduction related information is disclosed, and a score of 0 was assigned otherwise. 
CRE2 is measured using the Energy Saving Scores from the Hexun.com CSR database. 
Hexun.com was founded in 1996 and has become one of China’s largest financial 
information portals. Its Social and Environmental Responsibility ratings are designed to 
evaluate a firm’s engagement in the supply chain, employee welfare, shareholder interests, 
and social and environmental issues, which are widely used in previous research (Han, You, 
& Nan, 2019; Li, Zhang, & Foo, 2013). The Environment Responsibility rating covers five 
areas: Energy Savings, Types of Pollution, Investment in Environment Protection, the 
Accreditation of the Environment Management System, and Environmental Consciousness. 
Energy Savings is one of the most efficient ways for carbon reduction and it can also be 
implemented in any sector. We therefore employ the energy saving data as a proxy of a 
firm’s carbon reduction performance. 
3.3 Independent variable: institutional pressure 
Institutional pressure (IP) is measured based on the NDRC’s evaluation results of the 
carbon reduction in different regions. Since 2014, the NDRC, on behalf of the Chinese 
central government, has taken the responsibility to assess and rank the carbon reduction 
progress of each province. In addition to ranking the provincial carbon reduction performance, 
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the NDRC also grades the results into outstanding, good, pass and fail. The results constitute 
an important reference for the appointment, promotion, and rotation of local government 
officials. Based on institutional theory, we expect that the evaluation results will create 
significant institutional pressure for local governments to improve their carbon performance 
in the following year, and the institutional pressure will be higher for companies with lower 
grades. We therefore score IP from 1 to 4 according to the evaluation results (1 = the 
evaluation grade is outstanding, and 4 = the evaluation grade is failing). As a robustness test, 
we also replace institutional pressure with the ranking in the evaluation result (IP_R). The 
details of the evaluation results for the years 2013 and 2014 from the NDRC website are 
shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.4 Moderating variable: ultimate ownership 
We rely on ultimate ownership (SOEs vs NSOEs) as a moderator of the relationship 
between institutional pressure and carbon reduction engagement. SOE is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the ultimate owner is the government or a government-controlled institution, 
and it is 0 otherwise (Ruiqi et al., 2017). The information is obtained from CSMAR. 
3.5 Control variables  
Following prior studies (Ioannou, Li, & Serafeim, 2016; Matsumura et al., 2014; Sadler, 
2016), we control for the province- and firm-specific factors in our regression analysis. For 
the macro province-specific factors, we use regional GDP growth as a proxy for degree of 
local economic development attention (GDPgrowth) and area distinction to measure regional 
economic, legal and culture differences (Area). For the firm-specific factors, we control for 
industries based on the categories that are used in the NDRC’s guidelines. The NDRC issues 
guidelines on the measuring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions, which requests that 
high pollution industries report their carbon emission data. The industry difference (INDD) is 
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coded as one if the industry is classified as a high pollution industry in the NDRC guidelines 
and zero otherwise. Following Sadler (2016), we also control for market force factors in our 
model, which include the degree of internationalization (Export) and competitive position 
(Marketshare). A firm’s fixed-asset investment usually requires related environmental 
assessments, and we control for the increase of fixed assets (Invest) in the model (Ioannou et 
al., 2016). Corporate governance practices have potential effects on carbon reduction 
strategies, and, therefore, the institutional shareholding ratio (II), the shareholding ratio of the 
largest shareholder (F1), and the total number of directors (Director) are controlled (Ben-
Amar et al., 2017; Dyck, Lins, Roth, & Wagner, 2019). We further control for firm growth 
using the book-to-market ratio (BTM) (Matsumura et al., 2014). Finally, we also consider the 
firms’ financial characteristics that affect corporate climate-change strategies, such as firm 
size (Size), firm leverage (Lev), and firm profitability (ROA) (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & 
Vasvari, 2010). Table 2 presents the detailed descriptions of all the variables in the models.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.6 Model specification 
To test the effect of institutional pressure on corporate carbon reduction engagement, as 
well as the moderating effect of ultimate ownership, our regression models are as follows: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 ,
(1)
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
CRE IP SOE GDPgrowth Area INDD Export Marketshare
Invest II F1 Director BTM Size Lev ROA
Industry Year
       
       

       
       
  
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 ,
15 , 16 ,
*i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
CRE IP SOE IP SOE GDPgrowth Area INDD Export
Marketshare Invest II F1 Director BTM Size
Lev ROA Industr
       
      
 
       
      
   (2)y Year  
 
In all models, i and t denote the firm and year, respectively. We include industry and 
year fixed effects and use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the estimation. Based 
on H1, we expect the coefficient of IP to be significantly positive. To test the moderating 
effect of ultimate ownership on the relationship between institutional pressure and carbon 
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reduction engagement, we add the interaction item between institutional pressure (IP) and 
ultimate ownership (SOE) in model (2). The coefficient of the interaction item (IP*SOE) is 
expected to be significantly negative according to H2. 
4 Empirical results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample firms. Firms’ engagement in 
carbon reduction is quite low in terms of both reporting and performance. The average carbon 
reduction reporting (CRE1) is only 0.264 while the maximum score that a firm could get is 2. 
Regarding the carbon reduction performance (CRE2), the mean is 0.333 with a maximum 
score of 7 and a minimum of zero. The decisions to disclose carbon information and to 
reduce carbon emissions are both very low (mean of CRE1_D: 0.171 and mean of CRE2_D: 
0.077). Institutional pressure (IP) ranges from 1 to 4 with a mean of 1.228, which indicates 
that the pressure for most companies is mild and less dispersed (sd =0.525). The second 
measure of institutional pressure (IP_R) using the evaluation ranking for the robustness check 
ranges from 1 to 31. The variable SOE averages 0.395 and reflects that 39.5% of sample 
firms are SOEs. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Institutional pressure and corporate carbon reduction engagement 
Table 4 presents the results of our regression with different measures of carbon 
reduction engagement and different sets of fixed effects. The results using carbon disclosure 
measures are presented in columns 4-1 to 4-4 and the results using energy saving measures 
are presented in columns 4-5 to 4-8. IP is significantly positively associated with CRE1 
(coefficient = 0.031 and t-stat = 2.220 in column 4-4) and CRE2 (coefficient = 0.203 and t-
stat = 3.869 in column 4-8), which is consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H1. In 
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terms of marginal effects, a one unit increase in institutional pressure increases the carbon 
reduction reporting by 0.031 and the carbon reduction performance by 0.203, which is 
economically significant compared with the mean of carbon reduction engagement. Our 
results indicate that institutional pressure from governmental carbon reduction evaluations is 
more likely to promote firms’ engagement in carbon reduction activities. Moreover, ultimate 
ownership is also positively associated with firms’ carbon reduction reporting (coefficient = 
0.114 and t-stat = 5.527 in column 4-4) and carbon reduction performance (coefficient = 
0.126 and t-stat = 2.242 in column 4-8), suggesting that SOEs are more active in carbon 
reduction engagement than NSOEs.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Institutional pressure, ultimate ownership and corporate carbon reduction engagement 
Table 5 presents the evidence for hypothesis H2. First, we decompose the full sample 
into SOEs and NSOEs and separately compare the coefficients of institutional pressure 
between the two groups. The results show that institutional pressure is significantly and 
positively associated with a firm’s disclosure of carbon information for the NSOE group 
(CRE1 coefficient = 0.076 and t-stat = 3.162) while the association is insignificant for the 
SOE group (CRE1 coefficient = 0.003 and t-stat = 0.126). Moreover, the coefficient of 
carbon reduction performance (CRE2) is higher for the NSOEs (coefficient = 0.278 and t-stat 
= 6.959) than for the SOEs (coefficient = 0.164 and t-stat = 2.513). For comparison, we use 
the seemingly unrelated estimation (suest) and conduct a χ2 test to test the differences in the 
coefficients of IP. We find a significant difference for CRE1 and a marginal difference for 
CRE2. This is preliminarily consistent with hypothesis H2. Second, we apply Model (2) to 
investigate the interaction effect between institutional pressure and ultimate ownership on 
corporate carbon reduction engagement. The coefficients of IP*SOE on CRE1 and CRE2 are 
both significantly negative, suggesting that NSOEs are more responsive to institutional 
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pressure than SOEs. The results indicate that the effects of institutional pressure on carbon 
reduction engagement are distinguishable between SOEs and NSOEs. Our findings support 
H2 that the positive association between institutional pressure and carbon reduction 
engagement is more pronounced for NSOEs than SOEs. From a public policy perspective, 
our results highlight the importance of nonregulatory state-business interactions beyond legal 
compliance. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3 Further analysis 
Carbon reduction engagement and financial resources  
Having documented that institutional pressure increases firms’ carbon reduction 
reporting and promotes more carbon reduction performance, we try to further substantiate our 
conjecture that firms’ concern over access to different financial resources drives their carbon 
reduction engagement (Jung et al., 2016; Kusnadi et al., 2015). For example, according to the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission, firms with carbon reduction engagement could 
obtain concessional loans at relatively lower interest rates. Concerning financial resources, 
we focus on concessional loans and subsidies from the government, which are found to be 
linked with firms’ social and environmental related activities in the previous literature (Jung 
et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2017). 
We divide the sample into two groups according to their ultimate ownership: SOEs and 
NSOEs. Regarding concessional loans, we use whether a firm can obtain loans from a state-
owned bank (Loanstate) as a proxy (Firth, Lin, & Wong, 2008; Sapienza, 2004). As 
discussed in previous research, state-owned banks charge lower interest rates, impose fewer 
restrictions on capital expenditures (Firth et al., 2008; Sapienza, 2004), and especially favor 
SOEs over NSOEs (Wei & Wang, 1997). Following Sapienza (2004), we code Loanstate as 1 
if a firm gets one or more loans from a state-owned bank (Agricultural Bank of China, 
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Agricultural Development Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications, China 
Construction Bank, China Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
Postal Savings Bank of China, or Export-Import Bank of China), and 0 otherwise. Referring 
to Lim, Wang & Zeng (2015) and Minnis (2011), we also include several control variables 
for the potential effect on Loanstate in model (3), including the area distinction (Area), 
industry difference (INDD), the book-to-market ratio (BTM), firm size (Size), leverage (Lev), 
firm profitability (ROA), the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (F1), the tangible 
asset ratio (TOA), cash flows (CFO), and firm age (Age). 
Concerning government subsidies, we focus on corporate carbon related subsidies that 
are identified from the footnote information in financial statements in the CSMAR database. 
First, we identify the carbon related subsidies whose account abstracts contain the following 
key words: ‘carbon’, ‘environment’, ‘green’, ‘energy saving’, ‘clean technology’ and 
‘ecology’. Then, we aggregate the subsidies by firm and year, and get the carbon related 
subsidies and the total amount of carbon related subsidies. Last, we scale the carbon related 
subsidies using the total revenue. Following Lim et al. (2015), we also consider a number of 
factors as possible determinants of subsidies by including the area distinction (Area), the 
industry difference (INDD), the book-to-market ratio (BTM), firm size (Size), leverage (Lev), 
firm profitability (ROA), the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (F1), the firm tax 
rate (Htax), the earning target (ET) and the carbon related subsidies of the last year (LSubsidy) 
in model (4). 
All the data of above variables is obtained from CSMAR. Industry and year fixed effects 
are included in all models. The detailed descriptions of the variables’ definitions are given in 
Table 2. Our regression models are as follows: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 , 11 , (3)
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
Loanstate CRE Area INDD BTM Size Lev ROA F1
TOA CFO Age Industry Year
        
   
        
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Table 6 shows that carbon reduction reporting and performance are significantly and 
positively associated with firms’ access to state-owned bank loans for NSOEs (shown in 
columns 6-2 and 6-6), while the results are insignificant for SOEs. In addition, when using 
the seemingly unrelated estimation (suest) and conducting a χ2 test to compare the 
coefficients of CRE, we find statistically significant differences between SOEs and NSOEs 
regarding firms’ access to state-owned bank loans. The likelihood of NSOEs’ access to state-
owned bank loans increases by 15.2% (which is double the marginal effect of CRE1 on 
Loanstate, 0.076) and 25.9% (which is seven times the marginal effect of CRE2 on Loanstate, 
0.037), respectively, when CRE1 and CRE2 increase from their minimum to maximum. 
Government subsidies are not found to be linked with firms’ carbon reduction engagement. 
Overall, the findings substantiate our inference that financial incentives, especially 
concessional loans, drive NSOEs’ responses to government carbon reduction initiatives, 
which is consistent with the assumption of H2. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Corporate carbon reduction engagement before and after the evaluation 
From the above discussion, we find that the institutional pressure from the evaluation 
scheme has a positive influence on corporate carbon reduction engagement. While our 
research design has the advantage of observing the corporate response to institutional 
pressure in a pure carbon reduction setting, the relatively short time period we examined does 
not allow us to fully address the heterogeneity across the firms. To enable a comparison of 
corporate carbon reduction engagement before and after the evaluation was launched, we 
collected additional data on our sample firms during the years 2012 and 2013 using the same 
coding approach. To empirically test the difference, we add a period dummy variable (Post) 
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in the original models, which equals 1 if the year is 2014 and 2015, and 0 otherwise. We also 
add the interaction term between institutional pressure (IP) and the period dummy variable 
(Post), which is expected to have a positive coefficient according to hypothesis H1. The 
regression statistics are presented in Table 7 and the results are consistent. Particularly, the 
interaction term (Post*IP) is significantly positive, showing that the institutional pressure 
during the evaluation period can truly enhance corporate carbon engagement after controlling 
for the potential effect of the evaluation’s implementation. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Institutional pressure and subsequent corporate carbon reduction engagement 
Corporate carbon reduction engagement may be limited by existing conditions and may 
be realized in the next few years. We therefore further test the influence of institutional 
pressure on subsequent corporate carbon reduction engagement. We have collected the data 
for the year 2016, which is the beginning of the Thirteen Five-Year Plan, and we expect that 
there is a momentum of corporate carbon reduction under institutional pressure.  
Table 8 shows the empirical results. Institutional pressure (IPt-1) in the year 2015 has a 
significantly positive effect on corporate carbon reduction reporting and performance in the 
year 2016, while there is no positive effect of the institutional pressure in the year 2014 (IPt-2). 
The results evidence a momentum of carbon reduction under institutional pressure, which 
may persist for one year. We also examine the interaction effect of previous institutional 
pressure and ultimate ownership on corporate carbon reduction engagement and find 
insignificant results (the coefficients of IPt-1*SOEt and IPt-2*SOEt are both insignificant). 
This means that NSOEs are more likely to strategically manage their carbon reduction 
engagement in response to the temporal institutional pressure. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
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4.4 Robustness check 
Alternative regression model 
Because the dependent variables CRE1 and CRE2 are nonnegative, we use a negative 
binomial model to test hypotheses H1 and H2 for robustness check. The empirical results are 
shown in Table 9 Panel A. The coefficients of IP are all significantly positive and the 
interaction item (IP*SOE) is significantly negative, which is similar to the main results. 
Alternative measures of key variables 
As a robustness check, we replicate our tests of hypotheses H1 and H2 with alternative 
measures of our key variables IP, CRE1 and CRE2. We first use the natural logarithm of IP 
to diminish the variance of the institutional pressure measure. Second, we change the 
independent variable (IP) to the ranking, which ranges from 1 to 31 (IP_R). The results that 
are shown in Panel B (1) and (2) of Table 9 also support our hypotheses H1 and H2. 
We further assess the robustness of our measurement choice of corporate carbon 
reduction engagement. We use dummy variables to measure corporate carbon reduction 
engagement (CRE1_D and CRE2_D) in our model to test hypotheses H1 and H2 by applying 
a logistic regression. We get consistent results, as shown in Table 9 Panel B (3). We also use 
the dummy variables CRE1 and CRE2 to test the effects of carbon reduction engagement on 
firms’ access to state-owned bank loans and government subsidies. The results that are shown 
in Table 10 Panel A remain robust. 
Alternative sample–excluding NSOEs with political connections 
NSOEs with political connections have informal ties with bureaucrats and can receive 
unique resources from the government (Wang, Xu, Zhang, & Shu, 2018). We therefore 
conduct an additional test to check whether there is any potential endogeneity issue due to the 
political connections of some NSOEs. We exclude the NSOEs with political connections 
from our original sample. Following prior research (Feng, Johansson, & Zhang, 2015; Wang 
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et al., 2018), an NSOE is politically connected if the firm’s ultimate owner, board member or 
CEO is the member of the People’s Congress or the People’s Political Consultative 
Conference. The results that are shown in Panel C of Table 9 and Panel B of Table 10 are 
consistent with the main analysis. 
[Insert Table 9 and Table 10 about here] 
4.5 Other endogeneity issues 
To eliminate concerns over the selection bias of engaging in carbon reduction activities, 
we use the propensity-score matching method to compare the loans and subsides of firms that 
engage in carbon reduction with a matched sample of firms that are not involved in carbon 
reduction activities, assuming that selection occurs using observable firm characteristics. 
Specifically, following the prior literature (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), we first use the 
carbon reduction engagement dummy variables (CRE1_D and CRE2_D) as independent 
variables and apply a probit model, which is similar to model (1), to estimate the probability 
of engaging in carbon reduction activities within the full sample. Next, we calculate the 
propensity score for each observation based on the above regression and match each 
engaging firm with non-engaging firms having a caliper distance of 0.1 per year and industry 
without replacement. Finally, we get 312 observations with carbon reduction reporting, 1323 
observations without carbon reduction reporting, 311 observations with carbon reduction 
performance, and 1318 observations without carbon reduction performance. 
We compare the difference of variables in model (3) and model (4) before and after 
matching. After matching, there is no significant difference between the treated group and the 
control group in terms of the mean of the dependent variables. From the untabulated results, 
we can know that there is a significant difference in Loanstate between firms with carbon 
reduction reporting and firms without (p = 0.062), but after matching, the significant 
difference is eliminated (p = 0.304). In addition, firms’ key characteristics, such as firm size, 
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leverage, and the book-to-market ratio, are also less selective after matching. Using the 
matching sample, we get similar results for the effects of carbon reduction engagement on 
firms’ access to bank loans and government subsidies varying among SOEs and NSOEs, 
which are shown in Table 11. 
 [Insert Table 11 about here] 
5 Conclusion 
This study contributes to the growing literature on corporate carbon reduction 
engagement by examining the impact of institutional pressure arising from the government 
carbon evaluation scheme, as well as the influence of ultimate ownership on such an impact, 
in the Chinese setting. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2014 to 2015, we obtain 
the following original findings. First, we find a significantly positive association between 
institutional pressure and corporate carbon reduction engagement, which is measured using 
carbon reduction reporting and carbon reduction performance. Second, we document that the 
association is stronger for NSOEs than SOEs. These results show that firms’ reactions to 
government evaluation pressure are moderated by the ultimate ownership. Third, we further 
discover that the carbon reduction engagement of the NSOEs is positively linked with firms’ 
access to state-owned bank loans. Fourth, the empirical results also show that there is a 
momentum of corporate carbon reduction engagement under the institutional pressure. 
From a public policy perspective, our results highlight the importance of nonregulatory 
state-business interactions beyond legal compliance. Although the carbon reduction 
engagement in Chinese companies is, overall, rather low, we do find that institutional 
pressure can play an important role in promoting corporate carbon reduction engagement. In 
the meantime, the Chinese government should consider providing more financial incentives 
to firms, especially NSOEs, to engage in such a strategy. The NSOEs in developing countries 
usually have difficulties accessing bank loans, securing property rights, and enforcing 
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contracts (Kusnadi et al., 2015; Yen & Abosag, 2016). They would therefore have a stronger 
motivation to closely follow the state strategy to build up and/or strengthen their relationship 
with the government. Our results are also of great interest to potential investors in Chinese 
listed firms. Investors would be interested to know that active engagement with government 
initiatives to reduce carbon emissions is a significant mitigation strategy allowing firms to 
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Table 1 Regional carbon reduction evaluation grades and rankings of year 2013 and 2014 
from NDRC website 
Provinces 
Evaluation grades 
of year 2013 
Evaluation rankings 
of year 2013 
Evaluation grades 
of year 2014 
Evaluation rankings 
of year 2014 
Anhui Outstanding 18 Outstanding 11 
Beijing Outstanding 4 Outstanding 1 
Chongqing Outstanding 5 Outstanding 15 
Fujian Outstanding 19 Good 21 
Gansu Good 24 Good 27 
Guangdong Outstanding 3 Outstanding 13 
Guangxi Fail 29 Outstanding 14 
Guizhou Good 20 Outstanding 17 
Hainan Good 26 Good 26 
Hebei Outstanding 17 Outstanding 3 
Henan Good 23 Good 24 
Heilongjiang Good 25 Good 20 
Hubei Outstanding 8 Outstanding 12 
Hunan Good 22 Good 25 
Jilin Outstanding 7 Outstanding 7 
Jiangsu Outstanding 2 Outstanding 9 
Jiangxi Good 21 Good 22 
Liaoning Outstanding 15 Outstanding 6 
Inner Mongoria Outstanding 14 Outstanding 5 
Ningxia Pass 27 Good 29 
Qinghai Fail 31 Good 28 
Shandong Outstanding 16 Good 23 
Shanxi Outstanding 6 Outstanding 4 
Shaanxi Outstanding 13 Outstanding 19 
Shanghai Outstanding 1 Outstanding 8 
Sichuan Outstanding 10 Outstanding 16 
Tianjing Outstanding 11 Outstanding 2 
Tibet Pass 28 Pass 30 
Xinjiang Fail 30 Pass 31 
Yunnan Outstanding 9 Outstanding 18 




Table 2 Variable definitions 
Variables Descriptions Source 
Dependent Variables 
CRE1 Corporate carbon reduction engagement, which is coded as 2 if quantitative information is disclosed in the annual/CSR reports, 
coded as 1 if only qualitative information is disclosed in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Manually Coded 
CRE2 Corporate carbon reduction engagement, which is measured as the energy saving scores in year t. HeXun website 
CRE1_D Dummy variable of CRE1, which is coded as 1 if the value of CRE1 is larger than 0 in year t, and 0 otherwise. Manually Coded 
CRE2_D Dummy variable of CRE2, which is coded as 1 if the value of CRE2 is larger than 0 in year t, and 0 otherwise. HeXun website 
Loanstate Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm gets one or more loans from a state-owned bank, and 0 otherwise. CSMAR database 
Subsidies The total amount of the carbon related subsidies scaled by the total revenue in year t. CSMAR database 
Independent Variables  
IP Institutional pressure that equals 1, 2, 3, and 4 when NDRC’s evaluation grades is outstanding, good, pass, and fail, respectively, 
in the last year (see Table 1). 
Manually Coded 
IP_R Institutional pressure that equals 1, 2, 3,…31, which is the same as the ranking in the evaluation results of the last year (see 
Table 1). 
Manually Coded 
Moderator variable  
SOE Ultimate ownership of listed companies, which is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the ultimate owner belongs to the 
government or government-controlled institutions in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR database 
Control Variables  
GDPgrowth Percentage of GDP growth in the province where a firm operated in year t. CSMAR database 
Area Area distinction that is coded as 1 if the firm operated in eastern provinces such as Shanghai and Jiangsu, and 0 otherwise. CSMAR database 
INDD Industry difference that is coded as 1 if firm is in a high pollution industry in year t, and 0 otherwise. NDRC website 
Export Degree of internationalization, which is the ratio of firm’s foreign sales to its total sales in year t. CSMAR database 
Marketshare Competitive position, which is the ratio of a firm’s sales to the total amount of industry sales in year t. CSMAR database 
Invest The increase of fixed assets and construction scaled by total assets in year t. CSMAR database 
II Percentage of total outstanding shares that is held by institutional investors in year t. CSMAR database 
F1 Percentage of total outstanding shares that is held by the largest shareholder in year t. CSMAR database 
Director Total number of directors at the end of year t. CSMAR database 
BTM Book-to-market ratio, which is the ratio of the book value to market value of equity in year t. CSMAR database 
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in year t. CSMAR database 
Lev Book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets in year t. CSMAR database 
ROA Net income scaled by total assets in year t. CSMAR database 
TOA Tangible assets scaled by total assets in year t. CSMAR database 
CFO Ratio of the net cash flow divided by total assets in year t. CSMAR database 
Age Number of publicly listed years of a company in year t. CSMAR database 





ET Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm’s ROE after their nonrecurring gains and losses deduction ranges from -1% to 1% in 
year t. 
CSMAR database 
LSubsidies The total amount of carbon related subsidies scaled by total revenue in the year before t. CSMAR database 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Min Max Sd P25 P50 P75 
CRE1 4663 0.264 0 2 0.618 0 0 0 
CRE1_D 4663 0.171 0 1 0.377 0 0 0 
CRE2 4663 0.333 0 7 1.261 0 0 0 
CRE2_D 4663 0.077 0 1 0.267 0 0 0 
IP 4663 1.222 1 4 0.525 1 1 1 
IP_R 4663 11.64 1 31 7.894 4 11 17 
SOE 4663 0.395 0 1 0.489 0 0 1 
GDPgrowth 4663 0.071 0.000 0.129 0.023 0.064 0.077 0.085 
Area 4663 0.694 0 1 0.461 0 1 1 
INDD 4663 0.551 0 1 0.498 0 1 1 
Export 4663 7.391 0 82.27 16.54 0 0 4.925 
Marketshare 4663 0.015 0 0.235 0.035 0.001 0.004 0.011 
Invest 4663 0.014 -0.105 0.175 0.036 -0.002 0.006 0.023 
II 4663 1.750 0 32.94 4.690 0 0 1.332 
F1 4663 34.83 8.540 75.25 15.03 22.95 32.90 44.98 
Director 4663 8.611 5 15 1.711 7 9 9 
BTM 4663 0.729 0.054 4.189 0.746 0.269 0.476 0.867 
Size 4663 22.14 19.48 25.97 1.271 21.26 21.98 22.85 
Lev 4663 0.441 0.052 0.938 0.214 0.267 0.429 0.607 
ROA 4663 0.032 -0.199 0.188 0.055 0.010 0.030 0.060 
Loanstate 4663 0.376 0 1 0.484 0 0 1 
Subsidies 4663 0.149 0 3.507 0.459 0 0.006 0.087 
TOA 4663 0.637 0.196 0.938 0.162 0.531 0.650 0.759 
CFO 4663 0.006 -0.131 0.192 0.047 -0.015 0.002 0.022 
Age 4663 17.09 6 29 5.248 14 17 22 
Htax 4663 0.439 0 1 0.496 0 0 1 
ET 4663 0.093 0 1 0.290 0 0 0 





Table 4 The impact of institutional pressure on corporate carbon reduction engagement 
 
Carbon Reduction Engagement 
Reporting (CRE1)  Performance (CRE2) 
Model(1) Model(1) Model(1) Model(1)  Model(1) Model(1) Model(1) Model(1) 
 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4  4-5 4-6 4-7 4-8 
IP 0.036** 0.030** 0.038*** 0.031**  0.212*** 0.210*** 0.206*** 0.203*** 
 (2.679) (2.145) (2.756) (2.220)  (4.198) (3.995) (4.088) (3.869) 
SOE 0.126*** 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.114***  0.107* 0.127** 0.108* 0.126** 
 (5.937) (5.503) (5.937) (5.527)  (1.992) (2.269) (2.007) (2.242) 
GDPgrowth 0.218 0.337 -0.021 0.127  -0.031 0.206 0.864 1.074 
 (0.402) (0.598) (-0.038) (0.223)  (-0.032) (0.209) (0.863) (1.059) 
Area 0.034* 0.046** 0.035* 0.047**  0.061 0.071 0.058 0.068 
 (1.683) (2.087) (1.724) (2.113)  (1.321) (1.534) (1.255) (1.489) 
INDD 0.088*** 0.031 0.089*** 0.033  0.091* -0.062 0.088* -0.070 
 (3.651) (0.878) (3.692) (0.898)  (1.985) (-0.648) (1.903) (-0.768) 
Export 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (1.005) (1.335) (0.664) (0.991)  (0.907) (0.826) (1.253) (1.186) 
Marketshare 1.318** 1.590** 1.305** 1.570**  1.243 -0.322 1.292 -0.239 
 (2.644) (2.570) (2.627) (2.542)  (1.357) (-0.314) (1.406) (-0.230) 
Invest -0.107 -0.325 -0.122 -0.336  -0.405 -0.574 -0.350 -0.527 
 (-0.428) (-1.285) (-0.487) (-1.329)  (-0.769) (-1.137) (-0.658) (-1.037) 
II 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007** -0.008** 
 (0.888) (0.830) (0.509) (0.506)  (-3.485) (-3.531) (-2.081) (-2.177) 
F1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.645) (0.911) (0.537) (0.822)  (-3.089) (-2.867) (-2.942) (-2.742) 
Director 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***  -0.017 -0.012 -0.015 -0.010 
 (3.316) (3.269) (3.294) (3.261)  (-1.179) (-0.860) (-1.033) (-0.734) 
BTM -0.016 -0.014 -0.024 -0.022  -0.130** -0.133*** -0.098* -0.101* 
 (-0.600) (-0.513) (-0.833) (-0.719)  (-2.647) (-2.999) (-1.783) (-1.986) 
Size 0.179*** 0.173*** 0.184*** 0.177***  0.222*** 0.248*** 0.205*** 0.230*** 
 (13.501) (12.599) (13.472) (12.318)  (5.852) (6.142) (5.018) (5.264) 
Lev -0.198** -0.143* -0.196** -0.142*  -0.117 -0.091 -0.125 -0.097 
 (-2.609) (-1.817) (-2.554) (-1.783)  (-1.101) (-0.878) (-1.182) (-0.938) 
ROA -0.288 -0.291 -0.307 -0.310  1.096** 1.144** 1.170*** 1.224*** 
 (-1.182) (-1.333) (-1.287) (-1.453)  (2.565) (2.560) (2.740) (2.736) 
Constant -3.996*** -3.904*** -4.050*** -3.962***  -4.569*** -5.291*** -4.366*** -5.053*** 
 (-14.071) (-13.349) (-13.883) (-12.980)  (-5.808) (-6.222) (-5.350) (-5.675) 
Industry No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Year No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4663 4663 4663 4663  4663 4663 4663 4663 
Adj. R2 0.194 0.203 0.194 0.203  0.044 0.052 0.046 0.054 
Note: Two-tailed robust t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote statistically 
significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 The moderating role of ultimate ownership on the relationship between institutional pressure 
and corporate carbon reduction engagement 
 
Carbon Reduction Engagement 
Reporting (CRE1) Performance (CRE2) 
SOEs NSOEs Full sample  SOEs NSOEs Full sample 
 Model(1) Model(1) Model(2)  Model(1) Model(1) Model(2) 
 5-1 5-2 5-3  5-4 5-5 5-6 
IP 0.003 0.076*** 0.043**  0.164** 0.278*** 0.222*** 
 (0.126) (3.162) (2.669)  (2.513) (4.055) (4.238) 
SOE   0.116***    0.129** 
   (5.575)    (2.328) 
IP*SOE   -0.082**    -0.139* 
   (-2.554)    (-1.765) 
GDPgrowth 0.679 -0.497 0.139  2.477 0.122 1.095 
 (0.712) (-0.764) (0.242)  (1.244) (0.111) (1.075) 
Area 0.038 0.053* 0.049**  0.066 0.087 0.071 
 (0.924) (1.906) (2.178)  (0.848) (1.606) (1.582) 
INDD 0.017 0.150** 0.035  -0.014 -0.006 -0.068 
 (0.234) (2.389) (0.874)  (-0.141) (-0.034) (-0.690) 
Export 0.003** -0.000 0.000  0.004 0.001 0.002 
 (2.116) (-0.788) (1.003)  (1.353) (0.608) (1.195) 
Marketshare 0.838 1.744 1.531**  -1.129 0.378 -0.305 
 (1.227) (1.642) (2.498)  (-1.205) (0.199) (-0.299) 
Invest -0.074 -0.315 -0.331  -0.385 -0.450 -0.519 
 (-0.160) (-1.277) (-1.310)  (-0.425) (-0.734) (-1.017) 
II 0.000 0.003 0.001  -0.010* -0.006 -0.008** 
 (0.006) (0.792) (0.504)  (-1.686) (-1.323) (-2.190) 
F1 0.002* -0.001 0.000  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004*** 
 (1.845) (-1.208) (0.881)  (-1.357) (-1.428) (-2.703) 
Director 0.017 0.021** 0.020***  -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 
 (1.675) (2.682) (3.229)  (-0.171) (-0.623) (-0.745) 
BTM -0.019 -0.067* -0.020  -0.060 -0.080 -0.097* 
 (-0.417) (-1.821) (-0.635)  (-0.986) (-0.681) (-1.907) 
Size 0.230*** 0.135*** 0.176***  0.230*** 0.207*** 0.228*** 
 (9.108) (7.666) (12.299)  (3.125) (3.645) (5.188) 
Lev -0.293** -0.024 -0.138*  -0.458** 0.078 -0.090 
 (-2.239) (-0.350) (-1.765)  (-2.142) (0.600) (-0.853) 
ROA -0.738* 0.014 -0.309  1.339 1.256** 1.227*** 
 (-1.930) (0.071) (-1.483)  (1.590) (2.404) (2.772) 
Constant -5.094*** -2.977*** -3.945***  -5.086*** -4.571*** -5.026*** 
 (-9.212) (-8.165) (-12.995)  (-3.421) (-3.847) (-5.679) 
Industry/Year Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Diff. on IP 5.54** -  1.84 - 
Observations 4663 4663 4663  4663 4663 4663 
Adj. R2 0.179 0.131 0.204  0.055 0.056 0.054 
Note: Two-tailed robust t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote statistically 




Table 6 Effect of corporate carbon reduction engagement on firms’ access to state-owned 
bank loans and government subsidies varying in SOEs and NSOEs 
 
Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy 
SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs 
Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) 
6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6 6-7 6-8 
CRE1 0.018 0.180*** 0.008 0.006     
 (0.40) (3.09) (0.65) (0.39)     
CRE2     -0.036 0.044* 0.002 0.010 
     (-1.56) (1.93) (0.30) (1.61) 
Area 0.053 0.122** 0.002 -0.023 0.056 0.127** 0.002 -0.022 
 (0.78) (2.01) (0.11) (-1.32) (0.82) (2.10) (0.13) (-1.31) 
INDD -0.217 -0.216 0.014 -0.293*** -0.218 -0.191 0.014 -0.292*** 
 (-1.42) (-0.58) (0.31) (-3.00) (-1.42) (-0.51) (0.32) (-2.99) 
BTM 0.072 0.142* 0.013 0.010 0.070 0.133 0.013 0.010 
 (1.21) (1.76) (0.80) (0.42) (1.18) (1.64) (0.79) (0.44) 
Size -0.067* 0.061* -0.019* -0.009 -0.056 0.081** -0.017 -0.010 
 (-1.71) (1.66) (-1.72) (-0.91) (-1.48) (2.27) (-1.62) (-1.04) 
Lev 0.860*** 0.735*** 0.067 0.025 0.841*** 0.727*** 0.066 0.024 
 (3.94) (4.48) (1.10) (0.53) (3.85) (4.44) (1.08) (0.52) 
ROA -1.280* -0.078 0.238 -0.147 -1.259* -0.127 0.229 -0.160 
 (-1.80) (-0.15) (1.18) (-0.98) (-1.77) (-0.24) (1.14) (-1.07) 
F1 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.25) (-0.00) (0.20) (-0.46) (0.25) (-0.03) (0.24) (-0.41) 
TOA -0.806*** -0.336*   -0.812*** -0.310*   
 (-3.54) (-1.91)   (-3.56) (-1.76)   
CFO 2.007** -0.216   2.030** -0.245   
 (2.38) (-0.44)   (2.41) (-0.50)   
Age -0.004 -0.015***   -0.004 -0.015***   
 (-0.58) (-3.10)   (-0.58) (-2.95)   
Htax   0.011 -0.011   0.011 -0.012 
   (0.50) (-0.61)   (0.51) (-0.64) 
ET   0.000 -0.004   -0.000 -0.004 
   (0.00) (-0.15)   (-0.01) (-0.16) 
LSubsidy   0.547*** 0.401***   0.546*** 0.401*** 
   (35.97) (28.55)   (35.96) (28.50) 
Constant 1.519* -1.727** (2.35) (1.38) 1.292 -2.166*** 0.512** 0.323 
 (1.77) (-2.14) 0.549** 0.300 (1.56) (-2.75) (2.27) (1.51) 
Industry/ Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diff. on CRE 5.01** 0.01 6.40** 0.74 
Observations 1832 2803 1840 2823 1832 2803 1840 2823 
Pseudo/Adj.R2 0.048 0.047 0.454 0.259 0.049 0.046 0.454 0.260 
Note: Two-tailed robust z/t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote 




Table 7 Corporate carbon reduction engagement before and after the evaluation launched 
 CRE1 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
Post 0.205*** 0.167*** 0.369*** 0.139* 
 (7.267) (4.469) (8.398) (1.743) 
Post*IP  0.063**  0.379*** 
  (2.038)  (3.653) 
SOE 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.061** 0.059** 
 (5.381) (5.327) (2.166) (2.053) 
GDPgrowth -0.116 -0.101 0.574 0.664 
 (-0.392) (-0.343) (1.262) (1.461) 
Area 0.013 0.020* 0.001 0.040* 
 (1.044) (1.726) (0.060) (1.884) 
INDD 0.025 0.026 -0.043 -0.041 
 (1.024) (1.059) (-0.786) (-0.791) 
Export 0.000 0.000* 0.001 0.001 
 (1.680) (1.682) (1.393) (1.424) 
Marketshare 0.709** 0.711** -0.119 -0.105 
 (2.591) (2.598) (-0.250) (-0.222) 
Invest -0.125 -0.119 -0.294 -0.259 
 (-0.980) (-0.936) (-1.190) (-1.051) 
II -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.003** 
 (-0.598) (-0.633) (-2.031) (-2.201) 
F1 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.542) (0.544) (-2.868) (-2.863) 
Director 0.009** 0.009** -0.007 -0.006 
 (2.502) (2.516) (-0.900) (-0.828) 
BTM -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.052*** -0.055*** 
 (-2.777) (-2.802) (-2.741) (-2.836) 
Size 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 
 (13.506) (13.615) (5.119) (5.351) 
Lev -0.055 -0.055 -0.042 -0.041 
 (-1.443) (-1.440) (-0.822) (-0.791) 
ROA -0.230** -0.227** 0.536** 0.555** 
 (-2.114) (-2.104) (2.388) (2.533) 
Constant -2.242*** -2.262*** -2.555*** -2.678*** 
 (-13.600) (-13.751) (-5.670) (-5.974) 
Industry/Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9246 9246 9246 9246 
Adj. R2 0.176 0.176 0.060 0.065 
Note: Two-tailed robust t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote 




Table 8 Impact of institutional pressure on subsequent corporate carbon reduction 
engagement 
 CRE1 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
IPt-1 0.068** 0.090*** 0.396*** 0.465*** 
 (2.425) (2.771) (5.727) (4.927) 
IPt-2 -0.051*** -0.040 -0.089 -0.137** 
 (-2.966) (-1.665) (-1.240) (-2.208) 
IPt-1*SOE  -0.059  -0.173 
  (-0.746)  (-0.832) 
IPt-2*SOE  -0.016  0.103 
  (-0.303)  (0.802) 
SOE 0.227*** 0.321*** 0.297*** 0.385** 
 (6.648) (4.264) (3.515) (2.118) 
GDPgrowth 0.387 0.391 0.083 0.083 
 (1.305) (1.310) (0.121) (0.121) 
Area 0.042 0.043 0.072 0.070 
 (1.275) (1.316) (0.882) (0.852) 
INDD -0.178 -0.173 -0.195** -0.186** 
 (-1.454) (-1.383) (-2.221) (-2.163) 
Export 0.002* 0.002* 0.002 0.002 
 (1.903) (1.906) (0.988) (0.987) 
Marketshare 0.909 0.910 1.004 1.035 
 (1.376) (1.367) (0.553) (0.568) 
Invest -0.309*** -0.312*** -1.669*** -1.649*** 
 (-3.800) (-3.885) (-4.544) (-4.426) 
II -0.003* -0.003* 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.882) (-1.859) (0.089) (0.088) 
F1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-1.591) (-1.674) (-3.730) (-3.783) 
Director 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.005 0.004 
 (2.727) (2.731) (0.196) (0.175) 
BTM -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.120*** -0.119*** 
 (-3.169) (-3.159) (-5.467) (-5.417) 
Size 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.402*** 0.401*** 
 (10.368) (10.271) (10.045) (9.884) 
Lev -0.088 -0.086 -0.316* -0.323** 
 (-1.324) (-1.273) (-2.011) (-2.057) 
ROA -0.190 -0.196 0.704* 0.679 
 (-1.534) (-1.538) (1.751) (1.671) 
Constant -4.389*** -4.402*** -8.419*** -8.414*** 
 (-10.555) (-10.522) (-8.994) (-9.004) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2636 2636 2636 2636 
Adj. R2 0.229 0.229 0.104 0.104 
Note: Two-tailed robust t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote 




Table 9 Effect of institutional pressure on corporate carbon reduction engagement and 
moderating effect of ultimate ownership: robustness checks 
Panel A: Alternative regression model–negative binomial model 
 CRE1 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(1) Model(2) 
IP 
0.147*** 0.217*** 0.655*** 0.709*** 
 
(3.458) (4.278) (3.254) (3.589) 
IP*SOE 
 -0.272***  -0.435* 
 
 (-2.818)  (-1.681) 
Panel B：Alternative measure of key variables 
(1)Natural logarithm of IP 
 CRE1 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(1) Model(2) 
ln(IP) 
0.054** 0.068** 0.384*** 0.408*** 
 
(2.211) (2.557) (4.349) (4.659) 
ln(IP)*SOE 
 -0.078**  -0.126 
 
 (-2.440)  (-1.655) 
(2)Institutional pressure based on government evaluation ranking 
 CRE1 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(1) Model(2) 
IP_R 
0.002 0.002* 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 
(1.440) (1.691) (4.728) (4.910) 
IP_R*SOE 
 -0.070**  -0.085 
 
 (-2.247)  (-1.126) 
(3)Using dummy variable to measure carbon reduction engagement 
 CRE1_D CRE1_D CRE2_D CRE2_D 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(1) Model(2) 
IP 
0.230*** 0.322*** 0.525*** 0.613*** 
 
(2.603) (3.439) (5.130) (5.971) 
IP*SOE 
 -0.377**  -0.443** 
 
 (-2.316)  (-2.443) 
Panel C：Alternative sample-excluding NSOEs with political connections 
 CRE1 CRE1 CRE2 CRE2 
 Model(1) Model(2) Model(1) Model(2) 
IP 
0.022 0.034* 0.205*** 0.229*** 
 
(1.486) (1.980) (3.015) (3.221) 
IP*SOE 
 -0.095**  -0.195* 
 
 (-2.193)  (-1.807) 
Note: Two-tailed robust z/t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote 
statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables, constant, and industry and 
year fixed effects are included in all the columns. For the sake of brevity, the table does not report the 




Table 10 Effect of corporate carbon reduction engagement on firms’ access to state-owned bank loans and government subsidies varying in 
SOEs and NSOEs: robustness checks 
Panel A：Different measure of corporate carbon reduction engagement using dummy variable 
 Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy 
 SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs 
 Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) 
CRE1_D 
0.059 0.244*** 0.015 0.009     
 
(0.78) (2.79) (0.70) (0.38)     
CRE2_D 
    -0.133 0.187* 0.010 0.038 
 
    (-1.25) (1.71) (0.34) (1.24) 
Diff. on CRE 
2.63 0.03 4.53** 0.39 
Panel B：Alternative sample size–excluding NSOEs with political connections 
 Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy 
 SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs 
 Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) 
CRE1 
0.018 0.219** 0.008 0.008     
 
(0.40) (2.53) (0.65) (0.32)     
CRE2 
    -0.036 0.107*** 0.002 0.017* 
 
    (-1.56) (3.12) (0.30) (1.87) 
Diff. on CRE 
4.09** 0.00 12.81*** 1.35 
 
Note: Two-tailed robust z/t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 





Table 11 Effect of corporate carbon reduction engagement on firms’ access to state-owned 
bank loans and government subsidies varying in SOEs and NSOEs (PSM) 
 Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy Loanstate Loanstate Subsidy Subsidy 
 SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs SOEs NSOEs 
 Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) Model(3) Model(3) Model(4) Model(4) 
CRE1 0.029 0.239*** 0.012 -0.019     
 (0.44) (2.90) (0.84) (-0.84)     
CRE2     -0.021 0.049* -0.000 0.016** 
     (-0.78) (1.87) (-0.04) (2.17) 
Area 0.142 0.058 0.009 -0.061* 0.282** 0.139 0.006 -0.028 
 (1.32) (0.49) (0.40) (-1.94) (2.44) (1.23) (0.19) (-0.85) 
INDD 0.286 -0.638 0.009 -1.010*** 0.177 0.433 0.108* -0.851*** 
 (1.22) (-0.90) (0.18) (-5.92) (0.74) (0.53) (1.75) (-4.35) 
BTM 0.024 -0.068 0.011 0.075* -0.018 -0.223 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.27) (-0.43) (0.57) (1.81) (-0.19) (-1.55) (-0.26) (-0.22) 
Size -0.053 -0.157* -0.010 -0.015 -0.009 0.022 -0.039** -0.014 
 (-0.77) (-1.95) (-0.63) (-0.72) (-0.12) (0.31) (-2.01) (-0.70) 
Lev 1.236*** 1.870*** 0.000 -0.050 1.364*** 1.293*** 0.271*** 0.004 
 (3.49) (5.26) (0.00) (-0.53) (3.74) (3.92) (2.90) (0.05) 
ROA -1.647 -0.813 0.320 0.105 -1.660 -3.667*** 0.757** -0.622* 
 (-1.44) (-0.77) (1.28) (0.37) (-1.23) (-3.05) (2.15) (-1.84) 
F1 0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.20) (-0.95) (0.12) (-0.57) (0.95) (-0.13) (-1.02) (0.15) 
TOA -0.991*** -0.435   -1.130*** -0.449   
 (-2.84) (-1.33)   (-3.29) (-1.41)   
CFO 2.456* -0.812   1.534 -1.701*   
 (1.87) (-0.89)   (1.10) (-1.85)   
Age -0.006 -0.023**   0.002 -0.013   
 (-0.51) (-2.37)   (0.18) (-1.47)   
Htax   0.025 0.003   0.067** 0.018 
   (0.92) (0.08)   (1.99) (0.50) 
ET   0.046 -0.029   0.013 -0.002 
   (1.28) (-0.45)   (0.28) (-0.04) 
LSubsidy   0.431*** 0.356***   0.428*** 0.301*** 
   (33.14) (17.40)   (25.44) (15.17) 
Constant 1.671 2.097 0.141 0.426 -0.254 -0.852 0.979** 0.395 
 (1.05) (1.16) (0.41) (0.94) (-0.15) (-0.55) (2.13) (0.90) 
Industry/Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diff. on CRE 4.18** 1.84 3.71* 2.41 
Observations 783 825 799 836 726 875 743 886 
Pseudo/Adj.R2 0.076 0.086 0.641 0.349 0.076 0.073 0.140 0.243 
 
Note: Two-tailed robust z/t-statistics in parentheses are clustered at the industry level; *, **, and *** denote 
statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
